State Shinto and the use of shrines in Japanese colonies by Takagaki, Cary S. (author)
1In the third month of 1868, the newly formed Meiji government announced its 
intention to return to the  system of government that had been in place during the 
Nara and Heian periods. This was a system that held to the concept of unity between 
church and state ( ). Thus, the Jingikan, Office of  (Shinto) Deities (often 
translated as Office of Kami Worship), was revived in that same month as one of seven 
departments in the Dajokan, the administrative organ of the state, and in an attempt to 
“purify” the tradition, a policy of separating Buddhism from Shinto ( )  
was adopted.1 However, in July of 1869, the Jingikan was given the highest rank of all 
government offices, placing it above the Dajokan, and in the following year an Imperial 
Rescript on the Enshrinement of the Kami was issued, asserting that, along with various 
Shinto gods, all the emperors of Japan were to be worshiped as :
Now that the imperial dignity has passed to Us, small and frail of form though we be, 
we are afraid both night and day that there will be some want in Our performance of 
the Imperial duties. We thereby enshrine with the Jingikan (The Office of 
Worship), the  of Heaven and Earth, together with the eight  of 
Kamimusubi-no-kami, Takamimusubi-no-kami, Tamatsu-memusubi-no-kami, 
Ikumusubi-no-kami, Taramusubi-no-kami, Omiyame-no-kami, Miketsukami and 
Kotoshironushi-no-kami, and along with them, the souls of all past Emperors. By this 
rescript, we vow to worship and serve them reverently. It is Our desire that all the 
people of the realm will respectfully conform to this act.2
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the role of the Jingikan in English, see Nelly Naumann, “The State 
Cult of the Nara and Early Heian Periods,” in John Breen and Mark Teeuwen. 
 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), pp. 47-67.   
2 Stuart D.B. Picken,  (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), p. 93. The 
“eight ” refer to the “Eight Deities of the ” ( ) which first 
appeared in the of 807. See Naumann,  p. 55.
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2With this rescript the emperor was promoted as a  in human form 
( ), as were his ancestors, and this explained his “divine” status (i.e., 
).3
A second rescript, the Imperial Rescript on the Dissemination of the Great
Teaching ( ), was issued in February of 1870. This reasserted the unity of 
religion and the state and proclaimed a commitment to spread an “official” Shinto:
With the greatest respect, We have considered how our ancestral  established the 
basis of the nation, how they ordained the imperial succession which should be 
transmitted through the ages and how those in that succession subsequently pointed the 
Way. Thus was worship and government united, as were the minds of the people. As the 
way of government was taught from Heaven, the manners of the people, even to the 
humblest, became elegant...As reign succeeds reign, we stand at the beginning of an age 
when all things will be renewed. It is therefore an appropriate time to make clear the 
original and fundamental teaching about government in Japan, Our direct Imperial rule in 
the Unity of Worship and Government, and through this act, to make plain to the realm, 
the Great Way of Restoration.
We hereby appoint teachers ( ) with instructions to disseminate the Way 
throughout the nation. Our subjects, give heed to this rescript.4
The above mentioned , Office of Proselytizers, was established within 
the Jingikan to carry out the task of disseminating “the Way.”
In 1871 the Dajokan continued its policy of bringing Shinto under its control by 
making all shrines government institutions. Thus, Ise Shrine became the head shrine
under which all other shrines in Japan were ranked, and all Shinto priests were dismissed
and new ones appointed by the government.5
These policies appear to reflect a concern by the new Meiji government to return 
to the ideal of a state where the emperor held actual, and not only titular, power. But, of 
                                                 
3 Murakami Shigeyoshi.  (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1968), p. 141.           
4 Picken, pp. 92-93.
5 For details of the shrine system and ranks of Shinto priests see, Wilbur M. Fridell, “The 
Establishment of Shrine Shinto.” , vol. 2, no 2-3 
(June-September 1975), pp. 145-159.  
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3course what was really at work here was an attempt by the oligarchs of the fledgling 
government to establish a strong nation state by utilizing the religious authority of the 
emperor to gain the support of the people and to legitimize the state’s authority. Although 
the revival of eighth century institutions may seem archaic, the utilization of symbols 
such as the emperor and traditions such as Shinto, facilitated the transformation of Japan 
into a modern nation state. Japan, of course, was not unique in this respect—almost all 
states at one time or another have legitimized themselves with links to the sacred, and 
almost all religions, at one time or another, have claimed the authority to make 
themselves the basis of governments.
Accordingly, when Shinto came to be seen as a hindrance in the nation building 
process the government took steps to lessen its power. This was seen when, on August 8, 
1871, the office of the Jingikan was abolished, and its role was assumed by the Jingisho,
Ministry of  Worship (sometimes translated as Ministry of Shinto Deities). As the 
office was now just one of many ministries, its rank was lower than it had been. On 
March 14 1872, the status of Shinto was further diminished when the Jingisho was
incorporated into a Ministry of Religions (Kyobusho). It seems that the role of religion, 
and specifically Shinto in the nation building process gradually came to be reassessed as 
the Meiji oligarchs came to recognize that the administrators in the Jingikan were not 
able, or were unwilling, to adapt to the reality of religious tolerance being a fundamental 
tenet of the modern nation state:
Iwakura [of the Iwakura Mission, 1871-1873] headed a mission to negotiate revision of 
treaties, and everywhere he went he encountered the demand for freedom for Christian 
missionaries to proselytize freely within Japan as a precondition for negotiation. 
Toleration in religious matters was clearly one of the accoutrements of a modern nation 
Japan needed to gain recognition as such by her trading partners. It was evident that some 
Kami
4compromise with Christianity was inevitable, but Shinto leaders remained adamantly 
opposed.6
Thus, it appears to have been the intractable attitude of the Shinto clergy that was 
at issue here, and not the use of Shinto per se. Accordingly, the government remained 
committed to utilizing Shinto to mould Japanese citizens. Therefore, just a month after 
the establishment of the Ministry of Religion, the government established the Office of 
the Great Teaching (Taikyoin), mandating it to promote three precepts, or principles, that 
were to be held by all Japanese: “(1) ‘respect the  deities and love the country,’ (2) 
‘observe the way of heaven and practice the way of humanity,’ (3) ‘serve the emperor 
and respect the will of the imperial court.’”7
However, owing to the government’s ability to control those who could propagate 
the teachings (i.e., the ), the state’s control of Buddhism and its blatant use of 
Shinto soon came under fire by both secular and religious elements.8 Mori Arinori, 
Japan’s first envoy to Washington from 1871 to 1873, criticized the percepts, arguing that 
this showed the government’s lack of concern for freedom of religion, and Shimaji 
                                                 
6 Helen Hardacre,  (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989), p. 31.
7 Yusa Michiko.  (Upper Saddle N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 
2002), p. 96. 
“…this  was a privately funded body, set up with government 
approval in January 1873 at the suggestion of representatives of the majority of 
Buddhist sects to coordinate propaganda, and to serve as a forum for cross-sect 
discussion on a range of issues… [but] the  was effectively hijacked by a pro-
Shinto lobby, and rapidly metamorphosed into a closely monitored institute for 
Shinto-propaganda.” Nitta Hitoshi, “Shinto as a ‘non-religion’: the Origins and 
Development of an Idea”, in John Breen and Mark Teeuwen. 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), p. 254. 
8“Under regulations issued in April and July 1874, all temple abbots and anyone wishing 
to preach had to undergo training, pass tests and be ranked as , and so the 
implication of the government’s retention of this right to appoint them was that it had 
won the  right to appoint and dismiss all Buddhist priests.” Nitta, p. 260.
kami
kyodoshoku
Shinto and the State, 1868-1988
Japanese Religious Traditions
Taikyoin
Taikyoin
Shinto in History
kyodoshoku
de facto
5Mokurai (1838-1911), a Buddhist priest of Nishi Hongan-ji, asked that religious groups 
be allowed to remain independent of the  Taikyoin: “Mori and Shimaji pointed out the 
contradiction between the Western concept of separation of church and state and the 
government’s program for popular education, which relied on the clergy as teachers.”9
Thus, the government came to recognize the problems with its relation to 
religious traditions, and in March of 1875 issued the following memorial:
The  and Buddhist and Shinto propagandists ( ) should be abolished, 
the administration of ritual should be placed under the jurisdiction, as before, of the 
; shrine priests should be entrusted with ritual at national and regional shrines. 
Preaching should be left to those who wish to engage in it. People should be free to select 
which religion, if any, they wish to adhere to; this will not be a matter for the court or for 
the law. 10
Thus, in April of 1875, the government mandated that religious organizations 
create their own educational institutions and, as long as they promoted the Three 
Principles, be allowed to propagate their teachings unimpeded by the government, This
rendered the Taikyoin redundant, and in the following month it was dismantled. In 
November of the same year the Meiji government issued a verbal agreement to religious 
freedom: “Far from supporting the government, religion at this time, owing to the 
divisions it was itself causing, simply added to the government’s woes. It would hardly 
be surprising if the government began now to doubt the value of religion and to seek to 
distance itself from it.”11
Nevertheless, the Meiji government was unwilling to abandon completely the use 
of Shinto traditions in the nation building process. Therefore, in keeping with its now 
                                                 
9 Kasahara Kazuo, ed. , translated by Paul McCarthy and 
Gaynor Sekimori. (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Co., 2001), p. 528.  
10 Nitta, pp. 257-258.
11 Ibid, p. 259.
Kyobusho kyodoshoku
Shikiburyo
A History of Japanese Religion
6official recognition of the separation of church and state, it came to promote what it 
called Shrine Shinto, which, it argued, was not a religion, and in a category different from 
Sect Shinto, which, it argued, was a religion.
Tanaka Yoritsune, chief priest of the Ise Shrine, and Senge Takatomi, chief priest 
of the Izumo Shrine, argued for this viewpoint, that is, that Shinto could be seen as a non-
religion:
The fact that the words for both ‘ritual’ and ‘government’ are read  in 
Japanese constitutes a great teaching, a constant reminder of origins. This teaching is the 
source of all the teachings of the world. This teaching has been inherited by emperors 
over the ages and there was never a change to its substance. Consequently, there is no 
distinction between deity and emperor: the Way of the kami ( ) and the Way of the 
emperor ( ) are one and the same. Here lies the essence of Japanese teachings; all 
ethics springs from here; the foundation of the  lies here. These teachings we also 
know as , the Way that sprang from the deities and is coeval with the 
deities. It should be clear as day that this  is not to be spoken of in the 
same breath as those religions that were founded by the wisdom of men.12
The argument, then, was that, “Shinto was synonymous with the Imperial Way, 
and so it was not possible to view it as one with other religions. Shinto was above those 
other religions and so was non-religious.”13
In January 1877, the Ministry of Religion was dissolved and a new Bureau of 
Shrines and Temples, Shajikyoku, was established in the Home Ministry. This was the
first step in separating the administrative and religious aspects of religious institutions. 
Accordingly, in 1900, the Shajikyoku was replaced by the Shukyokyoku (Bureau for 
Religions), which dealt with Buddhism and other “religious” traditions, and the 
                                                 
12 “Daikyokan setchi kengensho,” as translated in, Nitta , p. 262. For the original 
Japanese, see, Sakamoto Ken’ichi,  (Tokyo: Kokusho 
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13 Nitta, p. 262, quoting Sasaki Seishi, in the article, “Meiji 23nen Jingikan setchi undo 
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7Jinjakyoku (Bureau of Shrines), which dealt with shrines. As the politician Oda Kan’ichi
(1856-1909) noted: “Finally, in the year 1900, the government understood. It split the 
earlier into a  and a . The former now takes 
responsibility for what we mean by state Shinto; the latter is charged with Christianity, 
Buddhism and the various sects of Shinto—what we might call religious Shinto…”14
Thus, the argument went, when the Japanese government actively promoted State 
Shinto, either at home or abroad, it was not promoting or privileging one religion over 
another, it was simply endorsing nationalistic ceremonies and ideologies. 
In the prewar years Shinto spread to meet the needs of Japanese emigrants, and 
this was the case even when that emigration was domestic. Thus, when the government
offered subsidies and encouragement to former samurai to move to Hokkaido, they 
brought with them their local deities. For example, “In Ebetsu, a statue of Kato Kiyomasa 
(1362-1611), the daimyo of Kumamoto, on Kyushu, that the ex-warrior colonists had 
carried with them from Kumamoto as the symbol of the deity of Nishikiyama Shrine in 
Kumamoto at once became the guardian  of the entire settlement.”15
Japanese emigrants going overseas also brought their deities with them. In Hawaii 
in 1898, Hilo Daijingu, enshrining Amaterasu, was established.16 Amaterasu was also 
enshrined in Tokyo Shokumin Chi Jingu (“Tokyo Colony Shrine”) in Brazil: “Japanese
expatriate communities were organized very much like the prefectural associations in 
                                                 
14 Sakamoto Koremaru. “The Structure of State Shinto: its Creation, Development and 
demise,” in John Breen and Mark Teeuwen.  (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 2000), p. 273.
15 Kasahara (2001), p. 538.
16 Maeda Takakazu,  (Tokyo: Taimeido, 1999), p. 12.
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8Japan’s big cities that maintain local identity, with the shrine as the focus of social 
cohesion. Overseas shrines provided a spiritual bond with the home country…overseas 
shrines helped expatriates maintain their Japanese culture.”17
This would explain the choice of Amaterasu as the main deity in these shrines.
However, the case was different on the continent. 
Shanghai Shrine, established in 1933, was supported by local Japanese residents,
as was Kyoryu Shrine in Pusan, Korea (established in 1894; the name of this shrine was 
changed to Ryutozan Shrine in 1899). The former shrine was dedicated to Amaterasu, 
Emperor Meiji, and Emperor Jimmu, emphasizing imperial Japan in a cosmopolitan 
urban center. However, the latter shrine was dedicated to Amaterasu, Omononushi no 
Kami, and Kunitama Daijin, the latter two gods associated with managing land, or 
making land habitable, as well as Uwatsutsu no O no Mikami, Nakatsutsu no O no 
Mikami, and Sokotsutsu no O no Mikami. According to the eighth century history,
, the latter three gods, referred to as the Sumiyoshi no Sanjin, guided the 
regent, Empress Jingu (a.k.a., Empress Jinko), in her conquest of Silla in the third 
century.18 This, perhaps, reflects the view of the Japanese residents of Shanghai and 
Korea—they were not simply emigrants who needed a connection to their Japanese 
heritage, they were also in some sense imperialists with intentions on their new homes.
Given the conscious use of Shinto by the early oligarchs of the Meiji government, 
it follows that the tradition would also be used overseas once Japan adopted imperialism 
                                                 
17 Kasahara (2001), p. 538. For details on the Tokyo Shokumin Chi Jingu, see Ogasawara  
Sh¦ z? , (Tokyo: Yumani Shobo, 2005), pp. 17-18.
18 Sakamoto Taro, ed. . Nihon koten bungaku taikei, vol. 67 (Tokyo: Iwanami 
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9as part of its nation building program; if State Shinto was non-religious, and simply a 
manifestation of the Imperial Way, then, of necessity, it would have to follow wherever 
imperial Japan went. However, the spread of Shinto to meet the needs of Japanese 
emigrants was different than the active promotion of State Shinto in colonies by the 
government.
In medieval Japan when a warlord’s tutelary  was installed as the local deity, 
the people’s worship of that deity signified their submission to his rule. Accordingly,
“The Meiji expression of this pattern is to be seen in the placement of Ise as highest 
shrine in the nation, to which all Japanese were putatively connected by a tie of common 
descent from the imperial house and a concomitant obligation of obeisance.”19
Thus, “Just as the Ise cult was extended over the main islands to symbolize the
hegemony of the new Meiji regime, colonial subjects of the empire were expected to pay 
obeisance to Japanese deities as a mark of their submission to imperial authority,”20 and 
this was reinforced by the fact that shrines in the colonies were controlled by the 
Japanese military.
As noted above, with the Meiji Restoration Japan embarked on a policy of 
domestic imperialism with respect to Hokkaido in order to maintain sovereignty over the 
island, demarcate its northernmost borders, and to ensure that foreign powers recognized 
that it was populated by “Japanese.” Thus, the establishment of Shinto shrines on the 
island not only served the needs of the many Japanese who were being encouraged to 
settle to Hokkaido, but also proved helpful in accomplishing all of these goals.
                                                 
19 Hardacre, p. 84. See also Yoneji Minoru.  (Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu shobo, 1974), p. 31.
20 Hardacre, p. 95.   
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Sapporo Shrine (ranked as a minor national shrine in 1871, but upgraded to a 
minor imperial shrine in 1872, and eventually to a major imperial shrine in 1899), was 
the official shrine of Hokkaido as it had been designated the protecting shrine of the 
prefecture. This shrine actually replaced the Hakodate Hachimangu in Hakodate, which 
was connected to the Matsumae, who had been  in Hokkaido since the late 16th
century. Basically, then, one tutelary deity was replaced by another. But why was this 
seen as necessary? 
The answer lies in the nature of the deities. Hachiman, a god associated with war, 
was the main deity enshrined by the Matsumae who, when they arrived on the island, 
were faced with the challenge of subduing the indigenous Ainu population. However, by 
the beginning of the Meiji period, since the Ainu no longer presented a threat, the
situation on the island had changed. Accordingly, the deities Okunitama, Onamuchi, and 
Sukunahikona came to be housed in the official shrine of the prefecture. These were
tutelary gods of newly developed territory: Okunitama “Great Master of the Land,” and 
Onamuchi were seen as deities who could make land habitable, and Sukunahikona was 
seen as a deity who assisted Okinitama . These, then, were more appropriate gods for the 
many Japanese immigrants who came from Honshu and Kyushu to cultivate what was, at 
that time, relatively undeveloped land. However, the promotion of Shinto shrines in 
Hokkaido not only served the cultural and spiritual needs of the many new Japanese 
settlers; since Shinto shrines were under government jurisdiction, it also reinforced the 
control held over the island by the newly formed Meiji government.
Similarly, the promotion of Shinto shrines by the government overseas was also 
for more than just ministering to the needs of the Japanese in their new homes. This was 
daimyo
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especially the case when official shrines were erected in Japan’s colonies, where 
emigration of Japanese was not a primary consideration. Promotion of State Shinto 
overseas was, in effect, one more method of imposing Japanese hegemony on newly 
acquired territories.
However, the problem with establishing shrines in Japan’s colonies was that, 
State Shinto, although ostensibly non-religious, could nevertheless be interpreted in such 
a way as to stress not only the divine origins of the imperial family, but also the Japanese 
peoples themselves. If this was the case, then where did this leave the peoples of the 
colonies who were made to participate in ceremonies at Shinto shrines? Did this 
interpretation not exclude them, to some extent, from Japanese nationalism? Did this not 
reduce them to second class citizens, permanently the “other’? This problem was 
recognized by the Japanese themselves: 
In the  (“Yearbook of Religion”), published in the early part of 1939, Mr. 
Hideo Horie writes on the subject, “The Shinto Shrine Problem Overseas” (“Kaigai ni 
okeru Jinja Mondai”). The major problem, argues Mr. Horie, is that of the adjustment of 
the exclusively nationalistic aspects of State Shinto to the universalism that ought to 
inhere in constructive international intercourse…21
Although recognizing the exclusive nature of State Shinto, Horie argued;
“Shinto must go overseas…as the unique institution of Japanese political expansion…All 
this, however, does not necessarily involve an exclusive attitude toward non-Japanese 
peoples. On the contrary, it affords opportunity for sharing the blessings of the matchless 
Japanese community life with other races and nations and furnishes grounds for the hope 
thereby these gentile peoples may be deepened in feelings, united in loyalty, and 
broadened in human benevolence…Shinto…is not a thing which the state or the people 
of the nation should regard selfishly” 22
Horie then presents his interpretation of the universal nature of the tradition:
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“The nationalistic character found in the shrines does not inevitably veto a universal 
character… Shinto is broad. It includes humanitarianism and righteousness.” 23
Nevertheless, the author still privileges the Japanese, not only as the leaders of 
their Asian neighbours, but also in being able to thwart the agenda of Western powers 
which, he argued, had been promoted under the guise of “internationalism”:
The spirit of Shinto, which is the fundamental directive principle of our national life, 
must be utilized for the purpose of elevating the races of neighboring territories where the 
national relationships are complicated. Indeed, by means of this spirit of Shinto foreign 
peoples must also be evangelized. The self-interested internationalism, which has come 
into existence apart from the give and take of ordinary intercourse and which up to now 
has fought with the weapons of craft and deception, must be brought to its senses by the 
saving presence of the pure and holy spirit of Shinto.24
The “universal” spirit of Shinto, appears to have been a sense of sincerity, i.e.,
, , or .25 Nevertheless,  D.C. Holton, writing in 1942, was able 
to see clearly the agenda behind this rhetoric:
In a system of moral and political control under which truth is identified with official 
standardization it is easy to see how the essence of sincerity becomes conformity. The 
great liberalizing principle of Shinto, its contribution to the universalizing of the spirit of 
man comparable with the love of Christianity and the compassion of Buddhism, now, in 
its practical manifestations, finds its scope of expression only within the specifications of 
military and political utilitarianism.26
Thus, Holtom goes on to observe,
If Shinto really includes a humanitarianism that is effective in transfusing “self-interested 
internationalism” with good will, then all concerned must have like access to making 
contribution to the new whole, and personality, both individual and collective, must be 
respected. The experience of Japanese-dominated people has brought them deep 
misgivings on this score, not to say bitter resentment.27
                                                 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 158-59.
25 Ibid., p. 159.
26 Ibid., p. 162.
27 Ibid., p. 163.
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That is, despite such rhetoric, colonial subjects were acutely aware of the position
they occupied, and realized that State Shinto would not allow them to attain parity with 
mainland Japanese. The reality of this was nowhere more evident than when the question 
arose as to the enshrining of Koreans who had died in the Russo-Japanese War: “Only a 
few priests favored enshrining colonials who had died in battle; the majority favored 
restricting this privilege to ‘real’ Japanese, by whom they meant those born in the home 
islands of Japanese parents.”28
Taiwan became a colony of Japan in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
95, and almost immediately Shinto shrines were erected. In 1900, Taiwan Jinja (later
promoted to the higher rank of ) was established in Taipei, and was given the 
designation of imperial shrine of major grade ( ), which was, next to Ise, the 
highest rank for a shrine. It enshrined Prince Kitashirakawa no miya Yoshihisa (1847-95), 
who had died in the conquest of Taiwan, Amaterasu, and the above mentioned three 
traditional protective  of newly settled areas, Okunitama, Onamuchi, and 
Sukunahikona. By 1945, there were some  one hundred and thirty three shrines of various 
size and rank in Taiwan, sixty-eight of which were recognized as .29 Prince 
Kitashirakawa and the three protective deities were prominent in almost all of these 
shrines, even to the exclusion of Emperor Meiji, who appears in only a handful of 
locations, emphasizing the subjugation of the island by the Japanese people.
The Treaty of Portsmouth had granted Japan the southern half of the island of 
Sakhalin, the part below the 50th parallel, after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In 
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1910, Karafuto (the Japanese term for Sakhalin) Shrine was established in the city of 
Toyohara. This shrine was also given the designation of imperial shrine of major grade ,
and it too enshrined the three protective deities, no doubt as they were seen as protecting 
the northernmost limits of the Japanese empire. By the end of the war there were some 
one hundred and twenty-seven shrines on the island.
When the Japanese took over the railway rights in Manchuria after the Russo-
Japanese War, Liaodong Peninsula came under the administration of the governor general 
of Guandong Province (i.e., the commander of the Guandong Army), and shrines were 
quickly built in this area of China. Among them were Anto Shrine established in 1905 
and Senzan Shrine, established in 1908.30 The former enshrined Amaterasu, and the later 
Amaterasu and Okuninushi mikoto. Bujun Shrine was established in Bujun (Chin.,
Fushun), and the deities enshrined here were Amaterasu, Okuninushi mikoto,   Kanayama 
hiko no mikoto,  and Kanayama Hime no mikoto. Okuninushi mikoto, the “Master of the 
Great Land,” as already seen, was associated with managing land, and the latter two 
deities, as their names imply, were closely related to mining activities, appropriate in an 
area where large coal reserves were being exploited.31 The deities at Ryoyo Shrine, also 
established in 1909, were Amaterasu, Toyo’uke daijin, Emperor Jimmu, and Emperor 
Ojin. Amaterasu and Jimmu, of course, represented the imperial and divine tradition of 
Japan. Toyo’uke daijin, a deity associated with agriculture, was included as the area was 
being developed for farming, and Emperor Ojin, who was identified with Hachiman, the 
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deity of war, was appropriate for an area that had been the site of tension between Japan 
and Russia since the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.32
In this way, then, Shinto deities seem to have become not only symbols of Japan’s
imperialistic aspirations, but also symbols of its economic ambitions in the area.33
With the outbreak of war with China, an emergency order sped up the creation 
and consolidation of shrines overseas. In 1940, there were twenty-seven shrines in China
in areas occupied by Japanese, but by the end of the war there were at least fifty.34
Morever, once the war with China began, there was a shift to enshrine Amaterasu and the 
Emperor Meiji as the main deities—Amaterasu connected the imperial line to the gods, 
and Emperor Meiji represented the modern nation state of Japan. Perhaps more 
importantly, the worship of Emperor Meiji also “…exalts the ideas of the greatness of the 
national life and the indispensability of its imperial foundation, and assumes more of the 
aspects of a worship of the state than it does of direct emperor worship.”35
The Japanese military established seven shrines in Manchukuo in 1933, the year 
after the creation of the puppet state, and the process of shrine building accelerated 
rapidly: in 1936, nineteen shrines were built and in 1939, twenty-one.
P’u-i, the last Manchu emperor of China who had abdicated in 1912, was made 
chief executive of Manchukuo in 1932 by the Japanese Guandong army, and then 
emperor of Manchukuo in 1934, assuming the name, the Kangde Emperor. His role was 
purely ceremonial as the September 1932, Protocol Between Japan and Manchukuo 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 90. For an account of Emperor Ojin as Hachiman, see Brian Bocking, 
 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 60-61.
33 Nakano, p. 90.
34 Murakami (1968), p. 144.
35 D.D. Holtom,  (London & New 
York: Kegan Paul, 1995; originally published in 1938), p. 175.
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(Nipponkoku Manshukoku Giteisho) left the Japanese government responsible for the 
security and defence of the state. By 1940 there were 137 shrines in Manchuria. But this 
was a significant year as it marked the 2,600th year since the traditional date of the 
founding of the Japanese empire, and so under the guidance of his advisors, P’u-i issued 
the following imperial rescript:
Out of his own profound experience and conviction, Emperor Kangte [i.e., Emperor 
Kangde] has decided to enshrine the spirit of Amaterasu-Omikami in the new national 
shrine of Manchukuo and to pray for the welfare of Manchurians through the providence 
of the Sun Goddess. As an auxiliary of the shrine, a shrine dedicated to the memory of 
those who died for the founding of Manchukuo will also be established.36
The rescript emphasized that, although the leader of an autonomous state, the 
Manchurian emperor voluntarily sought the protection of Japanese gods for the people of 
Manchukuo. The principal deities enshrined in the puppet state were Amaterasu (in one 
hundred and twenty-seven of the country’s shrines), Emperor Meiji (in seventy-four
shrines), and Okuninushi no mikoto (in thirty shrines). However, these deities, of course, 
reflected the ambitions of the Japanese Guandong army in having created this state; the 
former two deities representing the presence of Imperial Japan in the region, and the 
latter a commitment to the taming of the resources of the land.37 Not surprisingly then, 
with the beginning of the Pacific War and the resulting glorification of the Japanese 
empire, shrine building increased, more than doubling, and there were 302 shrines in the
state by 1945
In 1919, Chosen Shrine (Jinja, later Jingu) was established in Seoul, the site of the 
Japanese Governor General of Korea. This shrine was given the designation of imperial 
shrine of major grade, appropriate for the capital of a Japanese colony, and housed 
                                                 
36 Holton (1943), p. 170.
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Amaterasu and Emperor Meiji. By 1937, there were also four National Shrines of Minor 
Grade , fifty-three , and three hundred and fifteen small shrines (i.e, 
) in the colony.38
In 1939, two years after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, Fuyo Jingu was
established in Puyo (Jpn., Fuyo) the ancient capital of Paekche, one of the three 
kingdoms that occupied the Korean peninsula from the first century B.C.E. to 668 of the 
common era. Given the city’s historical significance, the shrine was accorded the rank of 
an imperial shrine of major grade. Appropriately, the four  enshrined here were 
figures associated with the conquest of Korea in the past. They were, Emperor Ojin, 
Empress Saimei, Emperor Tenji, and Empress Jingu. Tradition holds that Ojin’s mother, 
Empress Jingu, when pregnant with him, put a stone in her sash to delay his birth, and set 
off for Korea, which consequently recognized Japan’s suzerainty when she subdued the 
country. As we have already seen, Emperor Ojin was associated with Hachiman, the deity 
of war, but according to accounts in the  and , it was also during his 
reign that there were increased relations with Korea following the conquest of the 
peninsula by his mother. 
Empress Saimei (594-661; the 35th and 37th monarch of Japan in the traditional 
count39) was said to have set off to render aid to Paekche when it came under attack from 
Silla and T’ang China, although the accounts relate that she died before she could get 
there. It was under her son, Emperor Tenji/Tenchi (38th emperor, r. 662-671) that Japan
                                                 
38 Nakano, p. 278.
39 Empress Saimei ruled first as Empress Kogyoku, succeeding her husband, the Emperor 
Jomei, but abdicated after three years, allowing her brother to ascend the throne as 
Emperor Kotoku. However, upon his death, the crown prince refused the throne, and 
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abandoned Korea. Thus, in 1939, three monarchs associated with Japan’s colonial 
interests in early Korea were enshrined in the ancient capital and Tenji, in effect, returned 
to claim the peninsula for Japan once again.
Shinto shrines were not only symbolically important in the colonization of Korea. 
The imposition of State Shinto ceremonies, especially in the school systems, had the 
practical function of indoctrinating the Korean people, and so, by the end of the war in 
1945 there were over a thousand shrines in the peninsula. This practical concern, then, 
also helps to explain the establishment of overseas shrines with the expansion of the 
Japanese empire:
The extension of control into realms beyond the island territories and the penetration of 
Japanese populations into overseas areas have had as their proper accompaniment the 
setting-up of Shinto shrines in new places and the worship of the deities of the homeland 
as the guardians of new ventures. Even more significant for the international aspects of 
Japan’s rise to hegemony in the Far East is the fact that the conception of the unity of 
government and religion has necessitated the establishment of shrines to home gods as 
agencies of political administration. Given the nature of the Japanese state and its 
inseparable association with Shinto belief and ritual, it is impossible to think of a political 
control apart from a vigorous determination to secure the subordination of conquered 
populations to the central religious interests of the state. Where go the Japanese armies 
there go the Japanese gods.40
And, indeed, where the Japanese army went, Shinto shrines soon followed: 
although Singapore Daijinu had been established in Singapore in 1922, on February 17, 
1942, two days after the island fell to the Japanese a new shrine was established, utilizing
the new name affixed to the island, Shonanto Jinja. Tarakan Jinja was established in 
Indonesia in 1942, soon after the occupation of the archipelago. The islands of Palau
were ceded to Japan after World War 1 at the Treaty of Versailles, but a shrine had been 
established there as early as 1911. However, shrine building accelerated from 1939 to 
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1940, and Nanyo Jinja, established in 1940, held the rank of Imperial Shrine, major 
grade.41 Akatsu Jinja was established in Saigon, San’a Jinja on China’s Hainan Island, 
and Hokoku Shrine on Bogor, Java.42
In order to enforce uniform policies on overseas shrines, the Department of Home 
Affairs (which had ultimate control of the affairs of State Shinto, both domestically and 
abroad), adopted the following regulations in 1938:
1. Amaterasu Omikami shall be enshrined and worshiped as the chief deity.
2. In general the sanctuary shall be constructed in Japanese  style…
3. Priests shall be Japanese Shintoists and at the same time men who possess an 
understanding of national polity. For this purpose a training agency shall be newly 
established in collaboration with the National Association of Shinto Priests and 
with the Japanese Classical Literature Research Institute.43
The issue of refusal by indigenous peoples to worship at shrines overseas was 
addressed in this statement, issued in 1936 by the chief of the home office of the South 
Heian province (Heian nando, the present day province of South P’yongan Province in
what is now North Korea):
As a matter of fact the shrines are public agencies whereby the ancestors of the Imperial 
Family and people who have rendered distinguished service to the state are enshrined, 
and where the subjects of the state may offer true reverence and commemorate their 
meritorious deeds forever. Thus the fundamental idea differs from that of religion. That is 
to say, from ancient times down to the present the shrines have been national institutions 
expressive of the very center and essence of our national structure. Thus they have an 
existence totally distinct from religion, and worship at the shrines is an act of patriotism 
and loyalty, the basic moral virtues of our nation.
Schools, whether or not they are founded by governmental or private agencies, 
and regardless of whether or not they are supported by religious groups, all without 
exception have their primary significance in the cultivation of national character. It is, 
accordingly, entirely proper that educational institutions which are charged with the 
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important duty of developing Japanese subjects, should carry out worship at the shrines 
for educational purposes. It is on no grounds permissible that school principals and 
teachers who unite their educational functions with those of religious propagandists, 
should confuse religion and education and be deficient in an understanding of the system 
of laws and ordinances which the state has established….44
Accordingly, if Korean teachers or foreign Christian missionaries refused to 
partake in Shinto rituals, they were relieved of their duties.45 For example, in 1935, the 
educator George McCune, a son of missionaries, and the missionary Samuel Moffett 
were forced to leave the country because they would not allow their students to 
participate at Shinto ceremonies. Eventually, however, most Methodists and 
Presbyterians complied with Japanese government regulations, which had the effect of
making it more difficult for Koreans to continue resisting the orders. 
The Vatican itself came to accept the official Japanese assertion that attending 
Shinto rituals was a civil rite, and on May 25, 1936, the Office of the Sacred 
Congregation of Propaganda Fide at Rome instructed Catholics in Japan to comply with 
the Japanese government’s instructions to attend Shinto ceremonies. The proclamation 
asserted: 
The Ordinaries in the territories of the Japanese Empire shall instruct the faithful that, to 
the ceremonies which are held at the Jinja (National Shrines) administered civilly by the 
Government, there is attributed by the civil authorities (as is evident from the various 
declarations) and by the common estimation of cultured persons a mere significance of 
patriotism, namely, a meaning of filial reverence toward the Imperial Family and to the 
heroes of the country; therefore, since ceremonies of this kind are endowed with a purely 
civil value, it is lawful for Catholics to join in them and act in accordance with the other 
citizens after having made known their intentions, if this be necessary for the removal of 
any false interpretations of their acts.46
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In conclusion, although what has been briefly outlined here shows how Japan 
utilized Shinto in its nation building and imperialist ventures, it should be pointed out that 
this was not the only religious tradition thus employed: “Led by the military, the state 
increasingly equated orthodoxy and ‘peace and order’ with a rigid interpretation of 
Japan’s ‘national polity’ ( ). At the same time, government agencies pressured the 
established religions into eliminating alleged discrepancies between their teachings and 
the imperial myth,”47
To avoid persecution, most religious groups gave into government pressure. 
Buddhists supported Japan’s imperialist ventures, rationalizing such aggression as 
ultimately leading to the peace of East Asia as a whole, thus reinforcing the government’s 
1938 call for a “New Order in East Asia” ( ), and the later 1940 assertion 
that it was creating a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” ( ). 
Accordingly, “Imperial Buddhism” ( ) was promoted and encouraged by the 
Japanese military.
Japanese imperialists saw no conflict of interest when Christian missionaries took 
up activities in Korea and Manchuria not only as a means of making converts, but also as
a way of showing support for the state; for Japanese militarists, “Japanese Christianity” 
( ), could be just as effective as Shinto in imposing the authority of 
imperial Japan. Thus, in 1938 the To-A Dendokai (Association for East Asian 
Evangelism) was formed and military chaplains were sent to China to service not only 
Japanese Christian soldiers, but also any Christian residents of the country. Moreover, as 
the 1930s progressed, Japanese Christians came to meld Christianity with Japan’s 
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traditional spirit, thought, and religion. By stressing Christianity’s compatibility with 
, (i.e., the emperor system) the movement actually 
became hostile to Western Christianity and “Japanese Christians” felt a sense of 
responsibility to take over missionary work in Japanese colonies and occupied territories 
from Western missionaries who were being forced out by Japanese government policies. 
Of course Shinto, being perceived as an indigenous tradition (at least compared to 
Buddhism and Christianity), with its connection to the imperial family, was a more
convenient medium to connect traditional Japan with the newly formed nation state. 
Nevertheless, the issue here is that a variety of venues were utilized by Japanese 
militarists to carry out their ambitions. In some sense imperialism on the 
religious/spiritual landscape was just as important or effective as imperialism on the 
battlefield.
tennosei Nipponteki Kirisutokyo
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